| In 1965, the 49ers drafted Ken Willard, a fullback from the
University of North Carolina, over players named Gale Sayers, Dick Butkus and Joe Namath.
Willard was an excellent fullback who had terrific hands, blocked very well and never
fumbled or blew an assignment. He was a really good, solid inside runner who went on to
have a fine and underrated career. It also took him about 4.9-5.0 seconds to cover 40
yards, and he rarely, if ever, broke a long play. However, that really did not concern the
49ers at the time. Willard was an excellent all-around football player who filled a
need, and, unlike Sayers, Butkus and Namath, he was someone the 49ers could sign and not
lose to the hated AFL. A few years earlier, Lance Alworth, the man Red Hickey had to have
to make his shotgun offense go, opted to bypass the financially strapped 49ers for the
filthy-rich Chargers of the rival league.
In 68, the Cowboys drafted David McDaniels, a wide receiver out of Mississippi
Valley State the school that later produced Jerry Rice in the second round,
because he ran a 4.4 or 4.5 for their scouts. But, when they got to training camp,
everyone could guard the seemingly slow McDaniels. Then, when the team put the watch on
him, he ran about a 4.8.
McDaniels was drafted for one reason: his workout numbers. However, the numbers were
skewed because, instead of running on a 40-yard surface, he ran on a shorter surface that
had been mismarked. As luck would have it, the good, old Bears had a similar clocking on
McDaniels, and the Cowboys were able to save face by passing him off to Chicago for a
second-round pick in 70.
Ever since McDaniels, it seems as though the teams that really dont do their
homework on the scouting end or have coaches who carry less than a full scouting workload
tend to put too much emphasis on the Scouting Combine and other postseason underwear
drills and lose sight of what the 49ers realized about Willard: It still comes down to how
you play football.
However, in many cases, especially those of underclassmen who enter the draft after
being off limits to scouts all year, workouts can help to fill in the missing pieces. For
instance, in Kentuckys offense, the team regards it as a mistake whenever it has to
throw a pass in the 19- to 35-yard range, because it prefers shorter routes. So, without a
workout, scouts could not tell how strong Tim Couchs arm is.
But, by the same token, D.J. Dozier went from a third-round pick who lacked breakaway
speed to a first-round pick because, instead of running a 4.6 in the 40, he shocked scouts
by running a 4.4. The only problem was he still played as though he had 4.6 speed and
never broke long runs.
In recent years, more and more clubs are learning not to take a Michael Haddix over a
James Jones because he has great Combine numbers, or a Jackie Shipp in Round One because,
despite average instincts, he works out like Superman. They must balance and weigh all
factors in the equation.
They also have come to realize that many of the top picks private workouts are
orchestrated by agents and trainers who taught these players how to shave time off drills
with perfect technique and form. Hence, these workouts have become almost worthless from a
football standpoint. |